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Abstract
People who interact with or make decisions about inverte-
brate animals have an attitude toward them, although they 
may not have consciously worked it out. Three philosophical 
approaches underlie this attitude. The fi rst is the contrac-
tarian, which basically contends that animals are only automata 
and that we humans need not concern ourselves with their 
welfare except for our own good, because cruelty and ne-
glect demean us. A second approach is the utilitarian, which 
focuses on gains versus losses in interactions between ani-
mals, including humans. Given the sheer numbers of inverte-
brates—they constitute 99% of the animals on the planet—this 
attitude implicitly requires concern for them and consider-
ation in particular of whether they can feel pain. Third is the 
rights-based approach, which focuses on humans’ treatment 
of animals by calling for an assessment of their quality of 
life in each human-animal interaction. Here scholars debate 
to what extent different animals have self-awareness or even 
consciousness, which may dictate our treatment of them. 
Regardless of the philosophical approach to invertebrates, 
information and education about their lives are critical to an 
understanding of how humans ought to treat them.
Key Words: cephalopod; consciousness; contractarian; ethics; 
invertebrate; nociception; pain; rights; utilitarian
I t is probably not surprising that people’s attitudes toward invertebrates, and indeed all animals, are human-centered. After all, as infants we are fi rst aware only of ourselves, 
truly egocentric (Berk 2000). Gradually we learn that there is 
a world separate from us, and by age 3 or 4 a child is busy 
exploring and cataloguing it. Later, in adolescence we go 
through another stage of egocentrism where we focus tightly 
on our place in this burgeoning universe. So anthropocentrism, 
the attitude that we are the measure of everything and the uni-
verse revolves around us, is predominant in human thinking.
This attitude is fostered by Western science (see Balcombe 
2010). Western society is individual rather than communally 
focused, emphasizing competition instead of cooperation and 
thus reinforcing an individual focus and increasing the ego-
centrism. Furthermore, there is a strong belief in the objec-
tivity of this view, so that it is not critically evaluated but 
assumed to be correct. This is supported by the Judeo-Christian 
view of humans as having dominion over the earth and all 
things in it. Some have pointed out that this dominion should 
mean protection and care, but in practice the industrial com-
plex has used it as an excuse for exploitation.
This attitude goes hand in hand with the arrangement of 
animals on a scala naturae, a sort of tree of life with “lower” 
organisms at the base, rising through simpler vertebrates to 
the peak—primates and, of course, humans. This hierarchi-
cal approach originated with Aristotle as a way of logically 
organizing all life, and was taken up by the Christian church. 
God was at the top of the chain of life, indicating perfection, 
and humans were the next step down, working toward it 
(Balcombe 2010). 
Surprisingly, there are modern versions, now with three 
peaks, showing insects, molluscs, and vertebrates increasing 
in neural complexity toward the apex of intelligence. Even 
now, people talk of “highly evolved animals” at these peaks. 
Of course this is untrue—simpler animals like nematode 
parasites and blind cave fi shes are very highly evolved for 
their demanding environment. And horseshoe crabs, whose 
fossils can be found in rocks from the late Ordovician, are an 
enduring model that may survive when recent “generalists” 
like octopuses and humans have passed on. 
No animal is better than any other, yet studies (Bekoff 
1994; Eddy et al. 1993) show that humans value intelligent 
animals and those similar to us over all others. For example, 
although invertebrates comprise 99% of the animals on the 
planet, Eddy and colleagues (1993) proved the vertebrate-
centered view by choosing only 3 invertebrates for their 
sample of 30 animals.
Whatever the particular bias, attitudes toward animals 
have a philosophical and ethical basis, even though those 
who hold them may not realize or explore the meaning of 
their attitudes toward animals in general and invertebrates in 
particular. There is a lot of variation, but the attitudes can be 
roughly categorized as contractarian, utilitarian, and rights 
based (Nussbaum 2001). 
The Contractarian Approach
This philosophy presumes the complete separation of hu-
mans and nonhuman animals. Writing long ago, Descartes 
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proclaimed that humans merited consideration in terms of 
pain and suffering because we have souls; all other animals 
did not have souls and thus were no better than automata 
(Balcombe 2010). He was supported in this by the Christian 
church, which sanctioned much cruelty to animals.
Disconcerting as it is to those who care for animals, this 
approach has one advantage: it asks us to evaluate the effects 
of our interactions with animals for our own good. Rollin 
(1985), talking about treatment of animals for research, places 
the responsibility for and benefi t of ethical behavior on our 
shoulders and argues that we must act fairly toward animals. 
As people who control animals’ lives, we must treat them well 
not because they “deserve” it but because it demeans us not to. 
For example, he asks undergraduate students using shock as a 
deterrent in their animal studies to fi rst try the shocks on them-
selves, so that they are aware of what they are doing. He calls 
on all humans to be moral actors.
Even industries that infl ict suffering on animals can min-
imize it in the name of moral action. A vertebrate-centered 
example of this approach is that of Temple Grandin (1995), 
who has described her understanding of the worldview of 
cattle and has developed a career in designing holding facili-
ties and slaughterhouses for them. She has designed places 
that minimize their daily stress and the trauma of death and 
notes her satisfaction in knowing that they are as well cared 
for as possible. 
Grandin also discusses the effect of working in such 
facilities on people. The Jewish man who conducts ritual 
slaughter of kosher beef considers this a calling and an act of 
religious piety; and Grandin (1995) sees his attitude as re-
fl ecting a need for ritual and respect at the death of animals, 
a need that is present in many cultures. Even so, routine kill-
ing can’t help but affect those who do it, and may engender 
internalized pain or repudiation as a means of emotional or 
psychological protection from the reality of large-scale ani-
mal slaughter. Grandin advises slaughterhouse managers to 
rotate the actual job of killing to enable workers to retain a 
moral stance—so that the act of killing never becomes com-
monplace and no one gets callous about life because of it.
A further challenge is that the modern, urbanized, techni-
cal world removes humans farther and farther from organisms 
of all kinds. In addition, Balcombe (2010) suggests that media 
coverage deliberately distances us from animals and distorts 
the understanding of their lives by focusing on the “excite-
ment” of the chase and the drama of death. But octopuses, for 
example, are predators that actually spend three-quarters of 
their daytime lives resting or sleeping, which doesn’t make 
“good press” (Mather 1988). Balcombe (2010) also points out 
that, in order to make ourselves seem more important, we use 
demeaning and uncomplimentary words not only to describe 
animals but also to insult humans—think of “beastly,” “brut-
ish,” “savage,” or even simply calling someone “an animal.” 
How much more true this uncaring attitude is toward inver-
tebrates! It is not just that their importance is seen as much less 
than their numbers indicate, but also either that they are simply 
not considered (Bekoff 1995) or, in the case of insects, that we 
are uneasy and even fearful around them (Hardy 1988). 
The most positive of human attitudes toward animals is 
Wilson’s (1984) “biophilia.” He writes that humans should 
gain an “inherent human affi nity for life and lifelike pro-
cesses” and that we will act ethically if we appreciate the 
living inhabitants of the planet in all their diversity. Again, 
the point is not the type of animal but that all animals benefi t 
when we care. Wilson (1984) has a long way to go to per-
suade us to love all animals.
The Utilitarian Approach 
A Gain-Loss Approach to Animal Ecology
The utilitarian approach to the importance of animals is ob-
jective: humans should assess gains and losses when making 
any decisions and judgments about animals. According to 
this practical view, the dominance of invertebrates in terms 
of number of animals means that they are critical to the sur-
vival of life on the planet and should therefore be respected 
and protected (New 1993). 
Kellert (1993) makes the point by emphasizing the value 
of invertebrates in waste decomposition, as food for humans 
and for the organisms that humans eat, as sources of chemi-
cals and drugs of immense benefi t to humans, and as indi-
cators of the health of ecosystems. Recent prominent 
developments illustrate this close-knit relationship between 
invertebrate and human welfare. Observing the decimation 
of bee colonies by disease, experts pointed out that bees’ 
pollination enables the production of many human food 
crops. And coral reef animals, which form the backbone of 
one of the most productive marine ecosystems (Ponder et al. 
2002), are threatened by a number of human actions. 
Assessing Pain as a Cost
The gain-loss equation applies to evaluation of the impact of 
human actions in particular situations and on specifi c ani-
mals or populations. For example, what are the impacts of 
fi shing, keeping animals in aquariums, and using them as 
experimental subjects? Unfortunately, it is often the human 
gains that are the major consideration and the losses to ani-
mals secondary. 
Debate has focused especially on the possibility that hu-
mans infl ict pain and suffering on animals and on how these 
conditions can be assessed in nonhuman animals. Evaluation 
of emotions in animals is fraught with subjectivity; indeed, 
many Western scientists refused until quite recently to even 
speculate that animals had emotions at all because it was not 
possible to properly prove their existence. Griffi n’s (2001) 
efforts over many years have helped but the problem of eval-
uating animal emotions is a huge one still.
The Signifi cance of Pain versus Nociception
Pain is valuable from an ecological perspective as it allows 
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which damage might occur or recur. Yet it is not a simple 
sensory modality. Even in humans, who can describe their 
physical sensations, it is not easy to understand (see Matlin 
and Foley 1997 for a textbook description). Merskey’s 
(1986) defi nition of pain as “information about actual or po-
tential tissue damage, or interpreted in terms of such dam-
age” conveys the variability of the sensation. 
The experience of humans shows that receptor signals of 
damage are not automatically processed and passed undis-
torted to the central nervous system and brain. There are 
many examples of rituals, sports, and wartime experiences 
in which humans are not aware of painful major tissue dam-
age for minutes or even hours (Matlin and Foley 1997); 
clinically diagnosed pain disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association 2000) is not tightly associated with actual dam-
age, only triggered or even unaccompanied by actual dam-
age; and phantom pain, the sensation from a lost limb, is the 
result of a central representation that endures after the pe-
riphery is no longer sending signals. Because of all these 
variations in pain, it is obvious that it has sensory, emo-
tional, and cognitive aspects in humans, and these make it 
diffi cult to identify in nonhuman animals, whose ways of 
communicating discomfort are often less well understood 
by humans.
One way to separate these different aspects of pain expe-
riences is to defi ne and evaluate nociception, the purely sen-
sory experience of the damage signal (Kavaliers 1988; also 
see Elwood 2011, in this issue). It is too simple to suggest 
that nonhuman animals have only nociception, especially if 
they exhibit learning and expectation of future stimuli—and 
many invertebrates do demonstrate at least simple learning. 
Evidence of Pain in Vertebrates (Fish) 
Braithwaite’s (2010) study of whether fi sh feel pain shows 
how such an investigation could be carried out for inverte-
brates. She notes that fi sh, as vertebrates, should have struc-
tural and brain similarities with mammals that experience 
pain, and her assessment of the anatomy of receptor systems 
similar to those of other vertebrates does show a clear paral-
lel. She looks at data about brain regions and fi nds that, al-
though the specifi c brain arrangement is different among the 
vertebrate classes, similarly functioning regions are present 
(this is harder to show in invertebrates). She then measures 
responses to stimulus situations that would be considered 
painful for mammals and demonstrates clearly comparable 
results, though of course not in brain location. 
In light of her observations, Braithwaite asks whether 
pain-inducing stimuli trigger differences in responses that 
matter to the animals’ daily lives, such as whether a fi sh is 
willing to tolerate the possibility of electric shock so that it 
can school with conspecifi cs (the answer is different for two 
fi sh species). The evidence indicates that it is important to 
look at interference with nonrefl ex (i.e., “planned”) behav-
iors and evaluate investigation of novelty as an example of 
such behavior. 
Given the positive answers for these studies, Braithwaite 
concludes that yes, fi sh do feel something like pain.
Assessing Pain versus Nociception in Invertebrates
This structural parallel between fi sh and other vertebrates 
makes it easier to prove pain in those species than in inverte-
brates, but an examination of nociception across different 
invertebrate phyla is a good starting point. 
Cnidarian sea anemones, for example, have stinging cells 
that they use on each other and that are also painful to hu-
mans and repellent to animals of many species (Braithwaite 
2010; Mather 2001). The anemones live in clones (groups 
of identical individuals), holding fast to the rocks of the 
seashore and catching drifting small animals and detritus. 
Clones that encounter each other have “wars,” stinging each 
other and infl icting considerable damage. They fl inch from 
these attacks and eventually one clone retreats from the other 
and is the loser in the encounter. These animals have no cen-
tralized brain and only a nerve net, yet they clearly exhibit 
nociception in this situation.
The anemones’ weapons are also used by other animals, 
in situations that seem to demonstrate learning. Hermit crabs 
pull anemones off the substrate and place them on their 
borrowed gastropod shells where they repel both crabs and 
octopuses, which learn to avoid the crabs as prey (Maclean 
1983). One study showed that chemical stimuli in water that 
contained an octopus stimulate hermit crabs to put anemones 
on their shells (Ross and von Boletzky 1979), presumably to 
repel predators. However, there is no evidence that the her-
mit crab learned this behavior.
The physiology of stress responses is clearly similar 
across many phyla. Stefano and colleagues (2002) point out 
that the immediate rise in immunocytes and a later increase 
in opiates in mussels and leeches subject to cold water shock 
are not only normal stress responses but the same as found in 
humans after coronary artery bypass surgery. These animals 
also show adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH) downregu-
lation of immunocyte activation, again similar to that of 
mammals. Even more interesting is the heart rate increase of 
juvenile queen scallops (Aequipecten opercularis) under 
predation threat when on a substrate that offered no refuge 
(Kamenos et al. 2006). And the heart rate of mussels in-
creases in response to a chemical cue in the effl uent of their 
predator, the dog whelk (Nucella lapillus; Rovero et al. 
1999). While these observations are scattered, they make it 
clear that the physiological systems are very similar across 
widely diverse vertebrate and invertebrate animals.
Elwood (2011) and his associates are the only research-
ers that have explicitly studied whether the nociception that 
an invertebrate shows to noxious stimuli could be extended 
to pain. The fi rst study (Barr et al. 2007) was on prawns’ 
antennal grooming. Prawn antennae are crowded with tactile 
and chemical receptors and are a major area for evaluation 
of waterborne sensory stimuli. Application of chemicals or 
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rubbing against the substrate, which was reduced by ap-
plication of the local anesthetic benzocaine (which did not 
reduce general arousal, only antennal grooming). Because 
the grooming is a targeted and not a generalized response, 
the authors suggested that it parallels the responses of fi sh 
and other vertebrates in similar situations and can be consid-
ered evidence of pain.
Elwood (2011) argues that separating immediate nocicep-
tive responses from longer-term cognitively guided pain 
responses will always be diffi cult because pain is such an 
imperative system that response is usually immediate. Ac-
cording to the utilitarian approach, the solution is simply to 
accept the importance of minimizing the effect (i.e., “costs”) 
of these stimuli on animals, whatever their perception of the 
stimulus might be.
The Rights-Based Approach
According to the rights-based approach both the agent and 
the receiver in any interaction have value and thus deserve 
consideration and respectful treatment (Regan 2003). This is 
the only one of the three viewpoints that focuses on the indi-
vidual and accords animals the right to bodily integrity and 
physical liberty. The spotlight is thus on the experience of 
the animals themselves. 
Nussbaum (2001) suggests taking into account an ani-
mal’s life, health, physical integrity, and emotional well-be-
ing. Such a perspective raises some diffi cult questions, such 
as whether it is defensible to exhibit animals (including in-
vertebrates) in aquariums and zoos, thus depriving them of 
liberty. And one of my colleagues asked whether this ap-
proach requires consideration of the potentially confl icting 
welfare of a parasite or its host. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to understand the basic 
physiology of the animal itself, whereas such knowledge is 
missing for most invertebrates. How can humans protect the 
right of the clam, the luna moth (Actias luna), or the nereid 
worm without understanding how the animal lives? Davis 
and colleagues (1999) make this point about the ascidians, a 
primitive chordate that is common but whose ecology is very 
poorly known: we might like or need to protect them if we 
knew how.
The rights-based approach demands close study of the 
experiences and awareness of animals and evaluation of the 
situations to which humans subject them. Does the animal 
have the learning capacity to recognize and respond to a 
stimulus that signals an event? Does it have the self-aware-
ness to know how trouble will affect it and the mobility to 
avoid trouble? The animal’s capacity to learn is important; 
Bekoff (1994) points out that suffering might be less bear-
able without cognition, which remembers the past and plans 
for the future, only dealing more effectively with an unpleas-
ant present. Many people say that invertebrates do not have 
consciousness or self-awareness, so it is important to exam-
ine their capacity in this area to evaluate what humans’ treat-
ment of them might mean. 
According to Broom (2007, 99), a sentient animal is 
“one that has some ability to evaluate the actions of others in 
relation to itself and third parties, to remember some of its 
own actions and their consequences, to assess risk, to have 
some feelings, and to have some degree of awareness.” This 
account of cognition and awareness certainly applies to ce-
phalopod molluscs, which studies have shown are heavily 
dependent on learning (Alves et al. 2008; Wells 1978) and 
may have consciousness (Mather 2008). The following sec-
tions therefore focus largely, but not exclusively, on these 
invertebrate species. 
Self-Referencing, Self-Awareness, and 
Self-Consciousness
Bekoff and Sherman (2004) propose three levels of under-
standing of self: self-referencing, self-awareness, and self-
consciousness. They believe that an animal’s fi t in these 
categories is dictated more by its behavioral ecology (e.g., 
whether it is social) than its brain size (within limits) or phy-
logenetic derivation. And presumably the animal’s place in 
these categories should dictate the treatment it receives from 
humans. For instance, a Korean-style restaurant in New York 
City cooks mixed shellfi sh and octopuses alive in a frying 
pan at the table. Do some of these animals or none of them 
deserve this treatment?
Self-Referencing
Self-referencing is the matching of a target individual to 
oneself and does not usually involve learning or cognition. 
Courtship of hetero- or homosexual individuals entails the 
identifi cation of species, sex, and readiness to reproduce be-
fore mating actually takes place.1 Dual-sexed hermaphro-
dites may compete with one another to see which will be 
which sex in the reproductive act (Anthes 2010). Simple 
awareness of self and of the identity of the target animal is 
necessary.
Self-Awareness
Self-awareness involves recognition that one is a self and 
that conspecifi cs are others, as well as a sense of one’s place 
in the world or possessions (e.g., shelter, territory). The ani-
mal may demonstrate learning and cognition, and the factors 
that infl uence its “decisions” may be simple or complex. 
Hermit crabs, for example, fi ght one another over the posses-
sion of shells in which to hide their vulnerable abdomen; 
they evaluate new shells for different durations and fi ght 
others with different intensities in different circumstances, 
including whether the contended shell is of a more desirable 
species (Elwood 1995). There may be evidence that they 
1Although some marine animals do not even do this—sessile species such 
as coral and bivalves use broadcast fertilization, simply releasing gametes 
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assess both their ability in relation to a rival and the “value” 
of the shell possession to calculate whether a fi ght should 
proceed (Elwood 2011). 
Further demonstrating self-awareness, cephalopods are 
excellent navigators for short distances (Alves et al. 2008), 
and some of their ability to locate themselves in the environ-
ment is learned. Field studies of octopuses (Mather 1991a) 
showed they forage freely across the ocean bottom, return-
ing to a sheltering “home” from a distance and over a time 
that necessitates spatial memory. They can return home by 
detours even after they have been displaced from their forag-
ing path (Mather 1991b). They also remember which areas 
they have been foraging in over the last few days and do not 
repeat searches in these locations where no prey is likely to 
be found. 
Interestingly, cephalopods’ “decision” of whether to 
consume a prey species in hiding near the capture location or 
whether to take it home to consume it is based on the dis-
tance to the home (Mather 1991a), clearly an indication of 
the awareness of oneself and one’s relative location. This 
ability has also been proven in the laboratory for octopuses 
and cuttlefi sh, and is an interesting parallel with the spatial 
ability of bees and mammals (Shettleworth 2010), suggest-
ing parallel competence across several phyla.
Self-Consciousness
What of self-consciousness, which likely involves cogni-
tion? The mirror test has become the critical evaluation of 
this capacity in primates (Gallup et al. 2002) and lately has 
been used on other vertebrates, although not without contro-
versy (Moses 1994). A simple version of the test is to expose 
the animal to its image in a mirror and evaluate reaction. A 
more stringent test is to make an innocuous mark on a non-
visible area of the animal’s body (e.g., its head), then to ex-
pose the animal to a mirror image of the area and see if it 
touches the mark. 
Cephalopods have the best potential of self-conscious-
ness of all the invertebrates, as they exhibit exploration and 
play, personalities and problem solving (Mather 2008). 
Octopuses exposed to mirrors show alerting and approach 
behavior, no different from their reactions to a view of an-
other octopus (Mather and Anderson, submitted). 
Two problems have been cited concerning the exposure of 
animals such as octopuses and cuttlefi sh to mirrors, assuming 
their failure at the task (Bekoff and Sherman 2004; Mather 
and Anderson, in press). First, although octopuses have excel-
lent visual acuity, they may not depend on that sense in the 
same way that mammals do. Second, they are generally asocial 
and so may not have complex behavioral responses to either 
the image or the actual presence of another octopus.
Deception
Another way to evaluate invertebrate animals for self-aware-
ness is to look at whether they show deception. Again the 
ability comes in three levels, with the simplest and most 
automatic being permanent deception (e.g., visual or other 
sensory camoufl age); many invertebrates have a deceptive 
appearance—for example, the lemon yellow dorid nudi-
branch gastropod (Tochuina tetraqueta) is a perfect match 
for the yellow sponges on which it lives and feeds. Similarly, 
kelp crabs (Pugettia producta) are excellent matches for the 
algae on which they live, and several species of shrimp 
mimic their gorgonian resting places exactly. Some insects 
have exquisite matching to aspects of the environment such 
as leaves and sticks, and moths mimic the bark of trees on 
which they hide. But these deceptive appearances are perma-
nent and selection is the machinery that determines them; no 
learning or cognition is present.
A second level is deception based on time and place. 
Cephalopods with their changeable skin show such ability 
with ease and often with a wide repertoire of displays for use 
in different situations. One example of such deception is the 
deimatic dots on the dorsal surface of cuttlefi sh (Langridge 
et al. 2007) and squid (Mather 2010). These dots appear on 
the skin surface in the presence of a low-level threat, as when 
a potential but not imperatively dangerous predator ap-
proaches. The cuttlefi sh shows two dots and the squid two of 
four on their large dorsal surfaces, presumably mimicking 
the eyes of a larger animal, as the dorsal surface is often 
turned toward the approaching fi sh. Indeed, there is a signifi -
cant correlation of appearance of lateral dots with the direc-
tion of the approaching fi sh, as the animals exhibit dots on 
the part of their body that can be most easily seen by the 
potential predator. Squid do not direct such warning displays 
toward conspecifi cs but toward a chosen target (Mather 
2010), thus they seem not to be automatic but chosen.
True deception occurs when animals give misinforma-
tion about resource-holding power or their ability to win 
contests. Caribbean reef squid (Sepioteuthis sepioidea) have 
“honest” formalized zebra display contests, in which the in-
tensity of the display is greater on the squid taking a position 
above, and that individual is the one that claims resources in 
terms of consortships with a nearby females (Mather 2004). 
There is no deception, as the animals trade places if the dis-
play of the lower animal is more intense. Juvenile squid, 
however, respond to the mating displays of an adult pair by 
engaging the male with a high-intensity zebra that does not 
accurately represent its ability to win a fi ght. Such a decep-
tive display intensity might mean that the juvenile later was 
able to mate with the female. 
Similarly, male cuttlefi sh have alternate morphs (skin 
displays) when they are courting a female (Hall and Hanlon 
2002). One of these displays signals dominance, and the 
male sets up a consortship and later mates with the female. 
An alternate deceptive strategy is for a male to adopt the 
same display as female cuttlefi sh and become a “sneaker,” 
changing its body pattern to then court and mate with a fe-
male when her consort is temporarily away. Unfortunately, 
Hall and Hanlon (2002) did not continue to watch sneakers 
over time, so they did not observe whether tactics differed 
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a discussion of alternate reproductive strategies, see Taborsky 
and Brockmann 2010). In reef squid, males adopt peripheral 
positions and sneaking strategies as subadults, then join visual 
display contests and hold consortships as they grow to maturity 
(Mather, unpublished observations). 
A striking example of deception over time is the mantis 
shrimp fi ghting technique (Caldwell 1986). Individuals occupy 
and often successfully defend their burrows in the substrate. 
The meral claw strike is dangerous, so shrimp seldom actu-
ally fi ght but favor visual displays to indicate their size and 
ability to hold the burrow. When females lay eggs or when 
any shrimp molts, their resource holding potential is consid-
erably reduced and fi ghts often result in displacement from 
a burrow. Weakened individuals instead use a meral claw 
spread to indicate size and resource holding potential. They 
also initiate fi ghts and are more aggressive in other ways just 
before they molt, enhancing their “reputation” just before it 
could most easily be challenged.
Scientifi c Evidence in Support of the 
Rights-Based Approach
Given this evidence that many invertebrates may have simple 
sentience sensu Broom (2007), and that the rights theorists 
believe that these animals have the right to a full, rich life, 
how should humans behave morally when interacting with 
them? It is helpful to look beyond simple evaluations and tap 
into the life history of the animal to see to what extent its 
natural behavior and needs are fulfi lled in captivity. 
Moltschaniwskyj and colleagues (2007) offer wide-rang-
ing guidance for appropriate care of a variety of cephalopod 
species. They also urge use of the 3Rs (reduce numbers of 
animals, refi ne procedures, and replace animals with alterna-
tives) for invertebrate subjects in experimentation. This ad-
vice is important because there is a trend to replace vertebrate 
animals in experimental work with invertebrates; but this re-
duces animal welfare concerns only if people believe inver-
tebrates are not aware of the consequences of many human 
actions. 
For example, crabs caught in commercial pot traps are 
declawed and then returned to the ocean (Patterson et al. 
2007, 2009), a practice that seems justifi ed by the fact that 
crabs sometimes autotomize a claw when threatened by a 
predator; declawing is thus seen as “natural” and not detri-
mental to the crab. The opposite turns out to be true: the ef-
fects are extensive and change several important aspects of 
the crabs’ lives. Studies show that claw removal is a signifi -
cant stressor (Patterson et al. 2007), raising the level of glu-
cose, lactate, and glycogen in the hemolymph much higher 
than baseline both in handled crabs and in crabs induced to 
autotomize. Furthermore, glucose and lactate were higher 
and glycogen lower when crabs were placed with conspecif-
ics after claw removal. Crabs are aggressive with one an-
other and the crab with one or more claws missing, whether 
by autotomy or removal, is at a signifi cant disadvantage to 
compete for and hold high-quality territories. 
Not only do crabs without a chela move down in the hi-
erarchy, they are at a disadvantage in feeding. Crabs with 
only one claw had signifi cant diffi culty consuming mussels, 
their common prey (normally the crab holds the mussel with 
one chela and crushes it with the other). In captivity they 
consumed a lot of alternative food (pieces of fi sh), but this 
option is likely not available in the wild. Some of the de-
clawed animals even died from hemolymph loss and others 
would have starved or lost signifi cant amounts of weight. 
Thus an intervention that looks like a harmless mimic of 
a natural situation is instead devastating to all aspects of the 
crab’s life. Patterson and colleagues (2009) therefore strongly 
recommend that this method be stopped.
The Importance of Supporting 
Species-Specifi c Normal Behavior
For rights theorists, even benign captivity can deprive an 
animal of its rights, and acting morally means ensuring all 
animals a full and complete life, including the rights to ap-
propriate housing, stimulation, reproduction, and feeding 
opportunities (see Broom 2001 for an extensive discussion 
of these topics mostly in mammals). 
The need to carefully choose appropriate species for cap-
tivity was recently highlighted by Mason (2010; although 
she ignored the invertebrates, as pointed out by Carere et al., 
in press). Again a good example is the cephalopods, for 
which Moltschaniwskyj and colleagues (2007) note clear 
limits in knowledge of their biology. They point out that om-
mastrephid squid suffer 100% mortality in rearing and are 
therefore not suitable for captivity. 
Octopuses, for example, explore and learn well, play, 
have personalities, and solve problems (Mather 2008). Is it 
right to keep these intelligent animals in a barren, restrictive 
aquarium tank? Studies clearly show that enrichment makes 
a difference to their biology: captive young cuttlefi sh in an 
enriched environment grew faster and ended up larger than 
those in a barren one (Dickel et al. 2000).2 Enrichment for 
these (and many other) animals helps to maintain healthy 
activity levels, alleviate the effects of confi nement, and en-
able animals to pursue species-specifi c normal activities.
A particular risk for intelligent and social animals is bore-
dom (Wemelsfelder 1993). Common symptoms of boredom 
are repetitive route retracing, constant attempts to break out of 
confi nement, and abnormal sleep and resting patterns. Octo-
puses in captivity are well known for their ability to escape 
from the confi nement of their tank, taking advantage of the 
manipulative ability of their arms. Aquarium owners use a 
wide variety of techniques to confi ne them, not always success-
fully. The fi rst recorded event was in the Brighton Aquarium 
over 100 years ago, when the captive octopus visited a 
neighboring tank and dined on a lumpfi sh each night for sev-
eral nights before returning to its home. But bored octopuses 
2Wells (1978), however, has argued that octopuses are used to hiding in a 
protective home and moving out for food, and that their solitary lifestyle 
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can also be destructive; Anderson (2005) describes an octopus 
that attacked her tank by repeatedly moving rocks around and 
scratching the glass, blowing gravel up from the bottom, and 
fi nally biting through the ties holding the undergravel fi lter in 
place, pulling it up, and tearing it into pieces, which were 
found fl oating at the water surface the next morning. 
One way to provide enrichment for octopuses in an 
aquarium is to provide substrate that is comparable to the 
animal’s natural environment, with rocks to make a shelter-
ing home and gravel (cuttlefi sh bury in gravel and should 
never be deprived of it; Mather 1986). Enrichment for octo-
puses also includes the provision of novel objects for ma-
nipulation and play (Anderson and Wood 2001). Octopuses 
will take apart any complex many-pieces object, and the 
children’s Mr. Potato Head toy is a favorite at several 
aquaria. 
If appropriate and at all possible, enrichment should also 
prepare the animal for release into its natural environment; 
for instance, hatchery-reared salmon are notoriously un-
aware of predators and are easily picked off (Brown and Day 
2002). Cephalopods should receive live prey so that they can 
exercise their natural predatory response. 
Anderson (2000), for example, describes the release of 
the giant Pacifi c octopus (Enteroctopus dofl eini) Ursula, who 
had come to the Seattle Aquarium by donation when she was 
very small. She was growing too large for her aquarium tank, 
so her keepers fed her live crabs for several days before her 
release to give her the opportunity to catch appropriate prey. 
When she was released (to a huge blast of publicity), divers 
followed her progress down to the seafl oor below the water-
front aquarium. The divers checked on her for the next 40 
days and noted the remains of three species of local crabs 
piling up in front of her den, so she was hunting successfully. 
When she was last seen, three males were also observed near 
her, so it is likely that she also fulfi lled the rights criterion of 
being able to reproduce. 
Thus it is clearly possible with captive octopuses to ac-
commodate the special needs of an intelligent invertebrate. 
Conclusion
Although theorists have not necessarily thought specifi cally 
of invertebrates in postulating humans’ attitudes toward ani-
mals, human attitudes are important to the welfare of these 
(and all) animals. Contractarian theorists value our human-
ness in caring about animals, utilitarians consider the impor-
tance of the 99% of animals that invertebrates represent, and 
rights theorists’ concentration on animals’ essential needs is 
useful for enriching the everyday lives of invertebrates. 
Education is key (Meehan 1995): as invertebrates are 
better understood, people—whatever their value system—
will come to appreciate and take better care of them.
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